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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 16667

EDWARD G. ROBICHAUX,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with one count of theft
in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-404 (1953), as
amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
on August 6, 1979, in Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, presiding.

The Trial Court sentenced

appellant to an indeterminate term of not less than one nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

The appel-

lant was granted a stay of execution of the sentence upon the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

condition that he serve ninety days in the Salt Lake
County Jail and pay restitution to the complainant in
an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole.

The execution of the ninety-day

jail sentence was suspended, pending the outcome of this
appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an order of this Court,
affirming the judgment of the jury at trial and the sentence of the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the summer of 1975, the appellant, Dave Felger, and three other men, formed North American Financial
Corporation.

One of the projects of the corporation was

a real estate development called Foxbridge.

Appellant's

chief responsibility in the corporation was to obtain foo~
ing for Foxbridge.

(T. 226)

Appellant approached Deseret

Federal Savings and Loan about obtaining a loan.

(T.182)

to the tight money market, appellant had, on· previous oc·
casions, obtained certificates of deposit (hereinafter CD'!
which were placed in lending institutions to encourage tl~
to make loans.

(T.182-83)

Appellant represented to Felger

. g ic
that it would be necessary to obtain CD's to get f un d in

Foxbridge.

(T.126-27)
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Accordingly, on September 3, 1975, Felger obtained a second mortgage on a

home he owned.

(T.125)

A Cashier's Check for $11,700 was made payable to the
appellant.

(T.126)

Appellant told Felger he would be

repaid out of the appellant's fee when funding for Foxbridge was obtained.

(T.128, 161)

On the same day, ap-

pellant Felger and Ed Eldredge drove to Zions

First Na-

tional Bank in downtown Salt Lake City where appellant was
to transfer $11,700 to a New York City bank, which would
dispense certificates of deposit to be placed with Deseret
Federal Savings and Loan.

(T.127, 170)

Appellant and El-

dredge entered the bank while Felger waited in the car.
(T.129)

Upon returning to the car, appellant told Felger

"everything was taken care of."

(T.130)

On September 3, 1975, appellant opened a personal
account with an initial deposit of $11,000 (State's Exhibit
11-P) and obtained $700 in cash (Exhibit 12-P).

On that

same day, he gave Eldredge a check for $4,680 from the account.

CT.172, Exhibit 13-P)

Within two weeks, appellant

had expended nearly $11,000 from the account.

(Exhibits

13-P through 18-P)
No certificates of deposit were obtained for placement with Deseret Federal Savings and Loan.

(T.175)
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No

funding was received through that bank, and Felger has
not recovered any of the $11,700 given to appellant.
(T.131)

North American Financial Corporation subsequently

dissolved, and the funding for Foxbridge was obtained
through another source.

(T. 2 32)

The trial judge instructed the jury on all elements of the crime of theft.

He further instructed the

jury that, since intent is not always susceptible of direct proof, it must ordinarily be inferred from acts,
duct, statements and circumstances.

~~

Accordingly, the

Court stated the law presumes a person intends the
able and ordinary consequences of his own acts.

reaso~

The Court

added that this presumption could be overcome by evidence
to the contrary.

The Trial Court further instructed

th~

no person could be found guilty of an offense unless his
conduct was prohibited by law and he acted intentionally
or knowingly.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

IT WAS PROPER TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT
THE LAW PRESUMES A PERSON INTENDS THE
REASONABLE AND ORDINARY CONSEQUENCES OF
HIS ACTS.
It is well established that the prosecution in
a criminal case has the burden of proving all elements of
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the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

This burden was

reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), as follows:
Lest there be any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that
the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.
397 U.S. at 364.

Accordingly, the only burden placed upon

the defendant in any criminal case is to present evidence
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt in
the minds of the jurors.

Commenting upon the weight of

evidence required to raise a defense, this Court observed:
... it is to be kept in mind that the burden
of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt is always upon the state
both initially and ultimately. Therefore,
the only requirement on the defense
is that it be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746

(Utah 1975).

The principal issue in the present case was
whether the appellant acted with the requisite intent to
be guilty of theft.

In order to prove intent, the State

was required to show appellant

had the "purpose to per-

manently deprive another of his property." The appellant
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objects to a portion of Jury Instruction No. 6, which
reads:
Intent or purpose, being a state of mind
is not always susceptible of proof by di~
rect and positive evidence and must ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct,
statements and circumstances. The law presumes that a person intends the reasonable
and ordinary circumstances of his own acts.
However, this presumption is a rebuttable
presumption and may be overcome by evidence to
the contrary.
Appellant contends that this language could be
interpreted by the jury as requiring the defense to prove
absence of intent.

Thus, the appellant claims this in-

struction relieved the prosecution from the burden of
proving all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt in violation of due process guarantees.

Respondent

rejects the contention and asserts that the instruction was
proper.
This Court recognized the value of making reason·
able inferences from proven facts in State v. Peterson, 22
Utah 2d 377, 453 P.2d 696 (1969).

The defendant in that

case was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon wiili ~
tent to do bodily harm.

On appeal, defendant contended tha

the intent to do bodily injury was not sufficiently establi
by the proven fact that defendant made a slashing motion
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toward his victim with a hunting knife, injuring the
victim's hand.

This Court affirmed the conviction,

stating:
... It is true that the State was unable
to prove directly what was in the defendant's
mind relative to doing harm to the victim;
and that he in fact denied having any such intent.
However, his version does not establish
the fact, nor does it even necessarily raise
sufficient doubt to vitiate the conviction.
If it were so, it would lie within the power
of a defendant to defeat practically any conviction which depended upon his state of mind.
As against what he says, it is the jury's privilege to weigh and consider all of the other facts
and circumstances shown in evidence in determining what they will believe. This includes not
only what was said and what was done, but also
the conduct shown, which in this instance they
may well have regarded as speaking louder than
the defendant's later defensive claims as to
what his intentions were. This is in accord
with the elementary rule that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts.
22 Utah 2d at 378, 453 P.2d at 697.

(emphasis added}

Allowing the jury to make reasonable inferences
from proven facts does not relieve the prosecution of its
burden to prove all elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

The instruction that a person intends the reason-

able and ordinary consequences of his acts recognizes the fact
that direct evidence of a person's intent is seldom available. As a result, intent, like any other fact, must often be

-7-
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inferred from evidence of the surrounding circumstances,
In the present case, the challenged instruction merely
allowed the jury to reach reasonable conclusions based
upon facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
It is well established that due process guarantees require a criminal conviction to be based upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the crime
charged.

In re Winship, 397 U.S.

358 (1970).

Accordingly,

the ultimate test for judging the constitutional

validi~

of a presumption is to determine whether it undermines "the
factfinders'

responsibility ... to find the ultimate facts

beyond a reasonable doubt."
Allen, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224

County Court of Ulster City v.
(1979).

The starting point in

applying this test is to determine whether the presumption
under review is perrni ssive

or mandatory.

surnption "tells the trier of fact that

A mandatory pre·
they must find

the elemental fact based upon proof of the basic fact."
99 S.Ct. at 2224.

When a permissive inference is used, the

prosecution does not rest its case entirely upon the pre·
surnption but

"may rely upon al 1 of the evidence in the

record to meet the reasonable doubt standard."
99 S.Ct. at 2229.

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Ulster case, the United States Supreme
Court upheld a New York statute which provided that the
presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive
evidence of its illegal possession by all persons occupying the vehicle.

The jury was instructed that,

... upon proof of the presence of the
machine gun and the hand weapons, you
may infer and draw conclusions that such
prohibitive /sic/ weapon was possessed
by each of the defendants who occupied
the automobile at the time such instruments were found.
The presumption .••
is effective only so long as there is
no substantial evidence contradicting the
conclusion flowing from the presumption,
and the presumption is said to disappear when
such contradictory evidence is adduced.
99 s.ct. at 2227.

The jury in Ulster was also instructed

on the presumption of innocence, the necessity to find intent

coupled with constructive possession, and the need to

find all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
99 S.Ct. at 2227.

Despite the fact that the instruction

called for the defendant to raise "substantial evidence"
contradicting the presumed fact, the Court concluded that
the inference was permissive since the jury instructions as
a whole "directed the jury to consider all the circumstances
tending to support or contradict the inference •.. ·"
9 9 S . Ct . at 2 2 2 7 .

-9-
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Having made this determination, the Supreme
Court stated that the standard to be used in judging
a permissive inference was whether,
... There is a 'rational connection' between the basic facts that the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter is 'more likely than
not to flow from' the former.
99 S.Ct. at 2228.
Respondent subrni ts the jury instruction that "a
person intends the reasonable and ordinary consequences of
his own acts" given in the present case created a perrniss i ve inference which did not undermine the jury's duty to
find all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Respondent further contends that this instruction satisfies
the rational connection standard noted in Ulster, since, ur.·
der the circumstances of this case, it is "more likely
than not" that appellant's actions demonstrated his intent t:
deprive another of property.
Viewed as a whole, the jury instructions clearly·
dicated that the presumption was to be treated as a perinis 5
inference.

It is established by Utah law that jury instruc:

must be reviewed in context.

Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2°

364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966); Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2dl6,
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414 P. 2d 575 (1966).
The appellant, however, base.s his contention
upon one paragraph of one instruction which he alleges
was improper and ignores the import of the instructions
as a whole.

The jury was carefully instructed upon the

presumption of innocence, the need to find guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt (R.42), and the defenses available to
the defendant.

(R.45)

Furthermore, language within the

disputed instruction itself shows that the jury could not
have interpreted the presumption as conclusive.

First,

the jury was instructed that the purpose to deprive meant
to have the "conscious object to withhold property permanently, or for so extended a period that a substantial portion of its economic value .•. would be lost."

It is not

likely that a juror could conclude appellant had the

~

scious ebject to deprive another of his property, simply
because this resulted from his actions.

Second, prior to

directing that the law presumes a person intends the reasonable and ordinary consequences of his acts, the Court stated
that intent "must ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct,
statements and circumstances."

(R.43)

The effect of using

presume and infer interchangeably would indicate to lay

-11-
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jurors that they were free to accept or reject the presumption.

The Court went on to state that the presump-

tion was rebuttable and could be overcome by evidence to
the contrary.

This instruction allowed the jury to re-

ject the presumption if any evidence to the contrary was
This burden is no greater than the burden of

presented.

creating a reasonable doubt which always rests upon the
defendant.

Finally, the instruction states that "no per-

son is guilty of an offense unless ... he acts intentionall
or knowingly."

(R. 43)

These instructions, as a whole,

make it improbable that the jury could find appellant intended to deprive another of property based solely on the
presumption that he intended the consequences of his acts.
The jury instructions in this case merely allowed the

ju~:

make reasonable inferences about appellant's intent based
upon facts presented in the State's case.
The permissive inference included in the jury ~
structions at issue satisfies the rational connection stanl·
ard of the Ulster case, supra.

Satisfaction of this stand·

ard requires a showing that the fact presumed is "more
likely than not to flow from" the facts that the
tion proved.

99 S.Ct. at 2228.

prosec~

In the present case, proof

of appellant's acts indicates it is more likely than not he
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acted with the purpose to permanently deprive another
of property.

First, after representing that money ob-

tained from Felger would be used to obtain certificates
of deposit (CD's) to induce the lender to make a loan,
appellant placed the funds in a private account.

Second,

within roughly two weeks of its deposit, most of the funds
had been spent for private purposes, and no CD's had been
obtained.

Third, appellant had not repaid any portion

of the money he received from Felger.

It was more likely

than not that the appellant's acts would result in Felger's
being deprived of his property.

Thus, there is a rational

connection between the facts proved and the presumption
that appellant intended to deprive Felger of his property.
The appellant cites Sandstrom v. Montana, 99 S.Ct.
2450

(1979),in support of his contention that, if the dis-

puted instruction could have been interpreted by a reasonable jury to shift the burden of persuasion to the defense,
the instruction violated due process guarantees.

However,

the instruction reviewed in Sandstrom is significantly different from the instruction in the present case.

As the Court

noted in Sandstrom,

-13-
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Sandstrom's jurors were told that 'the
law presumes that a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts.'
They were not told that they had
a choice, or that they might infer that
conclusion; they were told only that the
law presumed it.
The Court held that, since a reasonable juror could interpret this instruction either as a mandatory presumption or as a presumption shifting the burden of proving
intent to the defense, it violated due process.
at 2459-60.

99

s.ct.

However, the Court expressly stated it was not

reaching the question of the validity of a presumption
when the jury is instructed that it may be rebutted
by evidence to the contrary.

99 s.ct. at 2455.

The Utah Supreme Court recently reviewed the
Sandstrom holding in the case of State v. Eagle, No. 16129
(Utah Sup. Ct., May 6, 1980).

In that case, the Court re-

viewed the instruction that:
A person's state of mind is not always susceptible of proof by direct and positive
evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements, or circumstances.
This Court concluded that, since the jurors were instructec
that intent could be inferred rather than presumed, the in·
struction was valid.

Language similar to that reviewed in
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State v. Eagle, supra, was included in the disputed
instruction.

Regardless of the fact that the Trial

Court also used language of presumption, respondent
submits that the instruction would clearly indicate to
jurors that they could accept or reject the presumption based upon all the evidence presented.
The jury in the present case was also instructed
that it was a defense to theft if the appellant "acted
in the honest belief that he had a right to obtain or
exercise control over the property."

Accordingly, in

reaching a guilty verdict, the jury weighed evidence supporting the presumption against appellant's testimony that
he had been authorized to use the funds for personal expenses.

Recognizing the jury's duty as finder of fact,

this Court stated in State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777 (Utah 1977):
.•. it is the responsibility of the jury
to determine whether the elements of the crime
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court on appeal examines the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict;
and if it appears that the jury acted fairly
and reasonably, the judgment will not be disturbed.
564 P.2d at 778-9.
Based on the evidence offered by the State, the jury

-15-
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reasonably concluded that the appellant's acts
indicated his intent to deprive Dave Felger of his property.
In conclusion, the instruction that a person is
presumed to intend the reasonable and ordinary consequences
of his own acts did not violate due process, since it was
clearly intended to be a permissible inference and not the
sole basis for finding intent.

This permissive inferen~

satisfies the rational connection test given by the United
States Supreme Court in the Ulster case, supra.

Finally,

e

present instruction was not improper under the Supreme Cour:
recent ruling in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra.
POINT II
THE JURY INSTRUCTION THAT APPELLANT COULD
BE FOUND GUILTY OF THEFT IF HE ACTED INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY WAS PROPERLY GIVEN.
The appellant contends the Trial Court erred by
giving a jury instruction that:
In such a case as this, under the law, no
person is guilty of an offense unless his
conduct is prohibited by law and he acts
intentionally or knowingly. A person acts
intentionally under the law, either with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to
the result of his conduct, when it is that
persons's conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person acts knowingly when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances or that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(R. 43)
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The appellant contends that, since the statutory
definition of theft includes the specific intent element of purpose to deprive another of his property,
the jury should not have been instructed that the appel-

lant could be found guilty if he acted knowingly.

The

appellant further claims that this instruction made it
possible for the jury to find appellant guilty if they
concluded he engaged in reckless conduct which was reasonably certain to deprive another of his property.

This

instruction did not constitute error, and even if the
Court had erred in giving the instruction, the error
was harmless under the circumstances of this case.
The appellant was charged with theft, which is
defined in Section 76-6-404 of the Utah Code Ann. (1953),
as amended, as follows:
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
The Trial court instructed the jury on each elernent of the offense, defining purpose to deprive as,
... to have the conscious object to withhold property permanently or for so ex~
tended a period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost •.•.
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The source of this definition is Utah Code
tion 76-6-401 (1953), as amended.

Ann. Se

Inclusion of the

statutory definition of purpose to deprive in the same
instruction with the disputed language makes it impossible the jury could have found appellant guilty,
based upon reckless conduct which was substantially cer-

In

tain to result in deprivation of another's property.

reaching a guilty verdict, it was necessary that the jucy
find appellant acted with the conscious object to deprive
another of property.

In accordance with the jury ins true-

tions, such a conclusion necessarily would be based upon
a finding appellant acted at least with awareness of

t~

nature of his conduct, knowing that it was reasonably certain to result in depriving another of property.

(R. 43)

Thus, the conclusion that appellant had the purpose or
conscious object to deprive another of property cannot,
as appellant contends, rest upon a finding that he engaged
in reckless conduct which was reasonably certain to result
in deprivation of property.

Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-H:

(1953), as amended, states that a person acts recklessly,
... when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that ... the result will occur.
Acting in conscious disregard of a substantial risk does no:

-18-
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approach the culpability of acting with the conscious
object or purpose to deprive another of property
permanently, or for an extended period.

Therefore, ap-

pellant's contention that the disputed instruction allowed the jury to base its verdict upon a showing of
reckless conduct is without merit.
Even if the disputed instruction had been given
improperly, it was a harmless error since there was ample
evidence that the appellant acted with the purpose to deprive
another of property.

The State's evidence showed that Felger gave

appellant $11,700 for the express purpose of obtaining
certificates of deposit.

Appellant placed the funds in a

private account and wrote checks for his personal use.
No certificates of deposit were ever placed with the lender,
and Felger has not been repaid.

The evidence clearly shows

that these acts were intended to or reasonably certain to
deprive Felger of his property.

The only evidence to the

contrary was the appellant's testimony that he was told he
could use the money for his expenses.

The jury was also in-

structed on this theory of defense, and chose not to accept
it.
This Court encountered a similar claim in State v.
Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976).

The defendant in that case
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was charged with theft of copper wire from telephone
poles.

The Trial Court instructed the jury that "no

person is guilty of an offense unless .. he acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence ...

II

In reviewing this instruction on appeal, this
Court stated:
we concede that we do not see the applicability of the terms 'recklessly or with
criminal negligence'
to the particular circumstances involved here.
The critical issue
of fact centered upon whether, as defendant
Kazda said:
There was a 'Mr. Johnson' who
gave him a contract to remo\·e the wires, or
whether, as other evidence showed, that story
was a fiction protective of the defendant ....
The jury whose prerogative it is to choose
what evidence it will believe, chose to beliew
that of the State.
Despite defendant's brave
efforts to make it appear to the contrary, we
do not see how under the circumstances shown,
and the other instructions given, the inclusion
of the terms complained of could have been prejudicial to the defendant.
545 P. 2d at 192.

In the present case, the jury also chose to accec
the State's version of the evidence.

The appellant pre-

sented his defense to the jury and the jury was instruct~
on the law regarding mistake as a defense to theft.

Never·

the less, this testimony was not sufficient to raise a reasc
able doubt in the minds of the jury.
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The rule regarding reversible error was
stated by this Court in Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d
296, 383 P.2d 406

(1963), as follows:

In order to justify reversal, the appellant
must show error that was substantial and
prejudicial in the sense there is at least
a reasonable likelihood that in the absence
of the error the result would have been different.
383 P.2d at 408.
For appellant to prevail on appeal, he must
show that the Trial Court's instruction as to the necessary intent for the offense was such prejudicial error
that "there is at least a reasonable likelihood 8 that,
excluding such an error, the result would have been different.

In view of the substantial evidence showing the

relationship between the appellant's acts and the result of
depriving Felger of his property, the respondent submits
that any alleged error in instructing the jury was harmless.
CONCLUSION
The jury instruction that a person presumes the
reasonable and ordinary consequences of his acts did not
result in a denial of due process under recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, since this instruction,
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viewed in context, created a permissive inference which
did not undermine the jury's duty to base its verdict
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of
the crime.
The instruction that, in order to be guilty of
theft, a person must act intentionally or knowingly was
properly given since the jury was adequately instructed
in all elements of the crime and given statutory definitions of each element.

For the foregoing reasons, the

respondent urges this Court to affirm the conviction and
sentence the accused.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney Ge~eral
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant A~torney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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